0x7E96C5D2dd964BcCf631dd6ABD0750dA4Cf52dAaSwap on:Uniswap ↗external site · QUVR does not execute trades or take fees
Fomo Copilot ↗Elevated risk
There are notable risks. Go through the warnings below before deciding anything.
This is not advice to buy or sell and not a price forecast. Nobody can honestly predict memecoin prices: we only show verifiable risks and facts. Only put in what you can afford to lose.
Some sources failed — showing the last good data with timestamps.
Even small trades move the price noticeably; exiting a position may be hard.
What does this mean? →A $1,000 sell would move the price by about 23.8% (approximate).
What does this mean? →Transfer history was not fully loaded; holder metrics are approximate.
rpc v4 Swap logs
Not enough history yet — points accumulate every 15 s while the token is watched.
quvr snapshots (dexscreener)
1 theses
What Fomo traders post and what the price did after their post. Opinions, not a risk rating.
Simple explanation from the dev himself: Fomo traders are practically locked into their positions rn especially if you’re a top holder in a popular token. One sell and everybody sees it and that causes a cascade of sells. The credit layer would be receipt tokens where they’d put their position into a vault, get minted a 1:1 receipt token that mirrors the real positions value (and still shows up in their wallet and on FOMO/pump) and could use their position as collateral for liquidity without having to sell it. For Stonk tokens, people inherently are holding them for the reflections. ZCAT holders want the reflections so they don’t sell their ZCAT. But that locks up their liquidity. Reflections are basically troglodyte reflections but we can’t split it similar to how we can split tokenized stocks. We can’t however route reflections from the vault (that’s holding the collateral, ZCAT for example) back to the originator address so they can open up liquidity by using their position as coll…
No deployer token activity found.
rpc Transfer logs
| Verified source | No data |
| No dangerous privileges | 30 / 30 |
| Ownership/admin safety | 20 / 20 |
| Sell simulation | 20 / 20 |
| Proxy/upgrade risk | 10 / 10 |
| No transfer restrictions | 10 / 10 |
| Liquidity / market cap | 30 / 30 |
| Depth & price impact | 4 / 30 |
| Age & stability | 15 / 15 |
| Distribution across pools | 6 / 10 |
| Liquidity trend | No data |
| Top holder concentration | 35 / 35 |
| Deployer share | No data |
| Related clusters | 20 / 20 |
| Holder growth | 2 / 10 |
| No suspicious mass transfers | 15 / 15 |
Momentum ≠ safety
| New thesis velocity | 0 / 20 |
| Unique authors | 3 / 15 |
| Author quality | 4 / 25 |
| Confirmed by buys | 20 / 20 |
| Authors still holding | No data |
| Signal freshness | 1 / 10 |
The Blockscout API is unavailable without a key (bot protection on the public API). Analysis is based on bytecode and read-only calls.
| $100 | ≈ −3.04% |
| $1,000 | ≈ −23.85% |
| $5,000 | ≈ −61.02% |
Approximate: active liquidity at the current tick; tick crossings and hook fees are not modeled.
None found in the function dispatcher.
Transfers along the buy and sell path are not blocked
eth_call ERC20.transfer at block 87864625 (holder → pool, pool → new wallet) · sell: transfer to pool 0x8366a39cc670b4001a1121b8f6a443a643e40951: ok · buy: transfer from pool to new wallet: ok
Read-only simulation (eth_call) on the current block; nothing is sent to the network. Router, Permit2 and hook logic is not executed.
| # | Address | Share | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 0x0000…031c | 0.3% | related?contract |
| 2 | 0x8d15…c6f4 | 0.12% | fresh |
| 3 | 0xE5e7…e044 | 0.05% | related?contract |
Share of circulating supply excluding the addresses below
Heuristic based on shared signals. Does not prove the wallets belong to one person.